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ABSTRACT 
On the Potential for Improved Conflict Resolution through Entrepreneurship in Palestine. (May 
2015) 
 
Hunter Hampton 
Department of International Studies 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Ashley Passmore 
Department of International Studies 
 
The purpose of this research project is to gain insight into the role of the Israel-Palestine conflict 
in the entrepreneurial environment of Palestine. It takes into account both aspects of the conflict 
itself and reactions to the conflict in order to suggest policy changes to improve the prospects of 
entrepreneurs and for conflict resolution in Palestine. 
 
The paper analyzes a variety of different economic, political, and social data to develop a 
cohesive picture of the entrepreneurial environment, and to see whether there are statistical 
correlations between certain subsets of that data that could indicate areas where policy changes 
would be most effective.  
 
The results of the study suggest policy changes or new policy programs to aid in the peace-
building process in Palestine, based on social contact theory, the recommendations of other 
scholars working in similar regions, as well as the economic and security data analyzed here.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
  
The “Palestinian Territories” shall refer to the land allotted to the Palestinian Authority as a 
result of the Oslo Accords, that which is delineated by the “Green Line.” However, the author is 
aware that by no means is all of this territory effectively under the governance of the current 
State of Palestine. For example, the parts of East Jerusalem annexed or under the control of Israel 
are not included in World Bank or Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data, and it is not clear 
if it is included in World Governance Indicators data. For the sake of simplicity in writing 
however, this term should suffice. Likewise, “Palestinians” shall refer generally to those living in 
the aforementioned Palestinian Territories and excluding Israeli citizens termed “settlers,” 
without regard to ethnicity, religion, or creed. Please note that it does not include Israeli-Arabs, 
who are often of Palestinian descent. To include all Palestinians living in the Palestinian 
Territories, Israel, or elsewhere is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Additionally, throughout this paper the Palestinian Territories may be referred to using various 
designations (entity, region, etc.). Due to the nebulous status of the Palestinian Territories under 
international law, I have chosen to use vague terms wherever possible to avoid the appearance of 
“taking sides” in the issue. Under no circumstances should this choice be interpreted as a denial 
of Palestinians’ right to a state (whatever form that may take), and it should likewise be noted 
that I do not seek by whatever appellations I may use to assert any particular political goals or 
agendas. The goal of this paper is merely to provide an empirical analysis of possible policies 
that could bring about a positive change in the relationship, as it stands, between Israel and the 
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people of the Palestinian Territories. Conclusions made here are for the purpose of scientific 
inquiry alone, and should not be interpreted to reflect any biases or personal beliefs of the author.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
  
In recent years, much attention has been given to the phenomenon of the “Start-up Nation,” that 
is, the perceived explosion in growth of successful Israeli tech start-ups (Senor and Singer 2009). 
Books have been written on the topic, seminars held, and lectures given, and yet there has been 
relatively little interest in the entrepreneurial activities of the Palestinian Territories. For a variety 
of reasons, the economy of Palestine has never experienced the same degree of high output 
growth that Israel has. Although the purpose of this paper is not to specifically to identify a host 
of macroeconomic causes for Palestine’s relative lack of growth, the powerful dichotomy that 
exists between the two entities begs the question: what is the state of Palestinian 
entrepreneurship? Since the macroeconomic picture consists of many smaller microeconomic 
variables, a better understanding of the nature of Palestinian entrepreneurship could lead to 
greater insight into the region’s wider problems. Additionally, the impetus to explore this field 
gains further urgency from recent research on the confluence of conflict and entrepreneurship, 
which has sought to examine both the effects of conflict on entrepreneurial activities and the 
potential of entrepreneurship to contribute positively to conflict resolution between hostile 
groups. But the ability to develop policies and programs to address problems of entrepreneurship 
in the Palestinian milieu is hampered by scant research in the field that also incorporates the 
ever-present aspect of conflict. This is the problem that I will seek to address in this paper.  
 
The dearth of knowledge regarding Palestine’s entrepreneurial environment is understandable 
given the ever-changing state of affairs in that region of the world. When some form of conflict 
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breaks out in nearly annual intervals, data is often invalidated or made irrelevant far more 
quickly than in less volatile locales. However, this lacuna in the academic sphere belies the fact 
that research in this area could be greatly beneficial to policymakers in Israel, the Palestinian 
Territories, and other countries concerned with the region. Policies addressing the unique role of 
the entrepreneur and conflict are currently few and far between, even though some pioneering 
work in the field has been performed in other countries, especially Rwanda. And although the 
role of the entrepreneur in the global economic system is not the only factor in economic growth, 
it is certainly a vital cog in the machine, one from which the Palestinian Territories seem to have 
been unable to benefit. With that in mind, it would seem that research into the causes of this 
market failure could be of great value to the region as a whole.  
 
The objective of this paper is centered around the ineffectiveness of the Palestinian entrepreneur. 
According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Palestinians have “the lowest rate of nascent 
entrepreneurial activity of the seven GEM-MENA countries and much lower than the average for 
factor driven economies” (International Development Research Centre 2010). Much is made, of 
course, of the unstable political situation, but also of the many unique burdens which Palestinians 
must overcome in order to create a successful business. These challenges lie at the confluence of 
this paper’s research goals, which are 
 
1) to address the state of the Palestinian economy and its entrepreneurial component 
2) to assess the role that Israeli policy plays in entrepreneurial success and failure in the 
Palestinian Territories 
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3) to consider the potential that entrepreneurial activity holds for reducing conflict between 
hostile parties in Israel and the Palestinian territories.  
 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, consists of tying these three points together into a cohesive 
picture of the status, causation, and potential of the Palestinian entrepreneurial environment, 
which could ideally be used as a non-political framework for addressing the many problems 
between Israel and Palestine. Before moving into the components of this study, however, it is 
necessary to pay heed to the pioneering research into conflict entrepreneurship as well as the 
potential of entrepreneurship to support conflict resolution that has cut a path forward for this 
growing field of study. 
 
Two lines of academic thought are key to this paper’s goal. The first involves the role of policy 
on entrepreneurial effectiveness in a given society’s economy. The second involves the 
transformative role that entrepreneurship could fill within a society riven with conflict. The 
former will be discussed first. In their pioneering work in the field,  Halvor Mehlum et al. discuss 
their own research into the differences between normal firms and “predator” firms (Mehlum, 
Moene et al. 2003). Their argument is predicated on the idea that developing economies face a 
unique economic challenge on the choice that entrepreneurs face: whether to become a 
“predator” or whether to become a “producer.” They define a “predator” as a mafia-like 
organization that makes its living off of predation of other companies, people, or groups. This 
definition could even be extended to include rebel or terror groups. Naturally, these 
organizations are seen as destructive to economic growth. Producers are represented by more 
typical entrepreneurial activity, new firms. Critically, they suggest that predators and producers 
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compete for the same pool of entrepreneurs, and that at low levels of development, the position 
of “predator” offers more immediate profit. In many ways, this description mirrors that which the 
prospective Palestinian entrepreneur may face.  
 
The research of Anton Sabella et al. could provide supporting evidence for this stance (Sabella, 
Farraj et al. 2014). In their analysis of entrepreneurship in Palestine, they found that it had not 
contributed to statistically significant economic growth within the country, even though it is 
generally acknowledged that entrepreneurship is an important facet of growth in a modern 
economy. It is critical to note that their study of entrepreneurship excluded businesses in the 
informal sector due to the difficulty involved in measuring it. Amongst several possible 
explanations for the discrepancy between observed patterns and the theorized role of 
entrepreneurship was the possibility that rent-seeking behavior (a characteristic of predator 
firms) could lead to the non-existent correlation between economic growth and entrepreneurship. 
In their conclusion, Sabella et al. suggested that the informal sector could play a 
disproportionately large role in the economy. This is supported by the research of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor, which found that about 40% of Palestinian firms operate in the 
informal sector (International Development Research Centre 2010).  
 
Wim Naudé, an often cited scholar in the literature on entrepreneurship and economic 
development, provides an in-depth summary of the role of entrepreneurship in contributing to 
general economic growth, but also occasionally detracting from it (2008). He also highlights the 
dangers of the predator firm and rent-seeking behavior but in his conclusions focuses on the 
potential for government policy to effect positive changes on the entrepreneurial environment by 
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incentivizing those with the right skills and mindset to start businesses, and by improving 
education and the business environment more generally, with particular emphasis on the 
strengthening of institutions. Ultimately, Naudé believes that key changes such as these could 
improve the economy as a whole by improving the quality of entrepreneurship in the market. He 
suggests that “the result in many poor and underdeveloped countries would be to see an initial 
reduction in the rate of entrepreneurship” (2008) at first, but that this would be due to the hiring 
of workers into productive firms that would decrease the need for “necessity” entrepreneurship 
(Cañares 2011). The key implication of Naudé’s study is that policy could play a critical role in 
improving the status of entrepreneurship.  
 
With policy established as a legitimate means of addressing problems with entrepreneurship, it is 
important now to discuss a unique facet of the region’s economic dynamic that could be 
contributing to a negative feedback loop of disruption, chronic outbursts of violence. As any 
cursory glance at a year-in-review will reveal, violent conflict is a common, frequently occurring 
facet of life in Israel and, particularly, the Palestinian Territories. As the goal of this paper is not 
to identify a cause for this seemingly endless cycle of violence, it should suffice to say very 
generally that all sides of the conflict have at some point or another perpetuated violence in order 
to gain advantage over one another. However, if it is in the interest of the greater world to 
achieve peace in the region, then a host of new policies should be developed to effect the sea 
change needed for a chance at peace. As part of this paper’s purpose is to show that developing 
the entrepreneurial potential of Palestinians could lead to improved chances for lasting peace in 
the region, a review of the extant literature on entrepreneurship and conflict is now in order.  
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Perhaps the most critical addition to this literature review is that of two research papers on 
conflict resolution through entrepreneurship in post-genocide Rwanda. In the first, Jutta Tobias 
and Karol Boudreaux run a quantitative test on a variety of social and economic factors to 
measure correlations between entrepreneurial activities and conflict reduction in post-genocide 
Rwanda (2011). Although their survey was not conducted under ideal statistical circumstances, 
strong correlations were observed between participation within Rwanda’s new coffee washing 
stations, which were founded after government liberalization of the industry, and improved 
attitudes towards members of previously antagonistic groups (i.e. “Tutsis” and “Hutus”). In a 
follow-up to previous work on conflict-reduction in post-genocide Rwanda, Tobias continues her 
exploration of the potential of entrepreneurship to contribute positively to peace building in 
conflict-ridden regions (Tobias, Mair et al. 2013). Here, a correlating effect is identified between 
entrepreneurship, poverty reduction, and, correspondingly, decreases in violent conflict. 
Critically, their research suggests that the process whereby improved economic circumstances 
informs more positive outlooks on conflict resolution is sequential, in that economic 
improvement may be necessary to effect a positive change in this way. Both studies are careful 
to point out, however, that certain preconditions must be in place before similar results could be 
achieved elsewhere, namely an environment in which entrepreneurship is viewed as a joint 
enterprise between the antagonistic groups.  
 
Similarly, Victor Friedman and Helena Desivilya, whose study provides the closest natural 
analogue to the area of study in this paper, suggest that the incorporation of hostile groups within 
a single social enterprise could strengthen bonds between these groups and lead to a greater 
potential for lasting conflict resolution (2010). Their study, which took place in Northern Israel, 
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an area of greater Israeli Arab concentration than other parts of the state, recommended the 
implementation of a strategy designed to foster cooperation between Israeli Jews and Arabs by 
means of cooperation through social entrepreneurship. Friedman and Desivilya allow that social 
entrepreneurship can be defined very broadly, ranging from organizations for whom profit is 
secondary or even unimportant, to a very loose definition incorporating both the aforementioned 
and the average, profit-seeking firm, who by seeking to earn a profit nevertheless make changes 
in the social environment. For the purposes of this paper, social entrepreneurship will be viewed 
as those firms or organizations that contribute positively to the social and economic well-being 
of society as a whole. In other words, any firm that is not a “predator.”   
 
In this paper, I seek to fill two existing gaps in the literature: a quantitative analysis of policy’s 
effect on the Palestinian entrepreneurial landscape, and the potential for entrepreneurship to 
serve as a catalyst for conflict resolution between Palestinians and Israelis. The end goal is to 
show that research into the role of the entrepreneur and of entrepreneurship generally in 
supporting conflict resolution is a promising field of endeavor that could lead to improved 
policymaking in the future.  
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CHAPTER II  
METHODS 
 
This research will be conducted through a two-part analysis of Palestine and Israel. First, a 
review and analysis of relevant socioeconomic statistics will establish a basis on which a 
discussion of the entrepreneur’s place in Palestine will be conducted. Second, an analysis of 
current Israeli and Palestinian policies will lay the groundwork for a discussion of the effects of 
both entity’s policies on the economic situation in Palestine, and how alterations or revisions of 
those policies may be able to achieve the joint goal of economic improvement and conflict 
resolution. For this segment, I will primarily focus on Israel’s security policies, which are 
generally believed to be one of the most significant hurdles to Palestinian economic development 
(Chalabi 2013; International Development Research Centre 2010).  
 
Due to the lack of any measure or index directly counting the number of predatory firms in any 
society, closely related statistics will be used to approximate the amount of predatory activity 
taking place in Palestine. Under ideal circumstances, I would normally give particular focus to 
those measures indicated by Mehlum et al. as being particularly conducive to the development of 
predatory business activity: crime statistics, rebel groups, extralegal contract enforcement, and 
various forms of government and business corruption (Mehlum, Moene et al. 2003). However, 
due in large part to the unstable nature of the Palestinian government and the frequency of 
disruptive conflict, data which would normally be available and reliable is not forthcoming. Even 
if it is available, it is not always reliable or consistent. For example, numbers that one might 
think would be easy to find, such as casualty figures for combats, are made virtually unusable 
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due to inconsistent labeling of casualty categories (combatants, civilians, etc.). Additionally, 
Israeli sources often publish one number, and Palestinian sources publish another (usually 
bleaker) one. It is rarely clear which source is more reliable, and even when a seemingly 
unbiased source appears, such as from the Israeli humanitarian organization, B’Tselem, the data 
on casualty figures is incomplete and poorly documented. With that in mind, it is important to be 
completely honest and note that this study is severely hampered by the scarcity of reliable data. 
Care was taken to select data from reliable sources as much as possible, but even respected 
organizations like the World Bank are flummoxed in their data gathering, and the paucity of 
consistently collected time-series statistics tellingly indicates this. The data that I have used is 
therefore not ideal, but it is the best that could be reasonably collected given the limitations at 
hand. Further detail on the specific sources for each dataset will be provided wherever they first 
appear. 
 
Through the use of the available data, I will create a regression analysis of various indices in 
order to construct a holistic picture of correlating factors within the Palestinian entrepreneurial 
environment. These will be used to interpret, validate, and qualify policies that have been put in 
place by the Israeli and Palestinian governments. In order to illustrate the effects of policies on 
the various data, I will construct a time-series analysis indicating relationships between the 
approval and implementation of policies and their effects on the relevant indices. All 
relationships and comparisons will be displayed in graphs or tables in the results section of this 
paper. Additionally, the statistical methods that were used in the development of these analyses 
will be detailed mathematically where applicable.  
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The following indices will be used as proxies for predator firms and other corrupt activities. The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators project provides many useful data, five of which will be used 
here: Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, 
Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption (Kaufman, Kraay et al. 2014). The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators are constructed from “the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen 
and expert survey respondents” and are based off of data sourced from a variety of other 
reputable institutions in the private and public sector. Additionally, I will make use of various 
economic and social data from the World Bank as well as the Palestine Stock Exchange. It 
should be noted that many of the data published by the World Bank is collected from the official 
agencies of the countries in question. The West Bank and Gaza Strip (as it is denoted in World 
Bank publications) has had many issues with accurate reporting of data, and it is not always clear 
how reflective its officially published data is of actual circumstances. However, due to the lack 
of better sources for the information, this paper will assume that the World Bank data is 
reasonably accurate.  
 
The second stage of this paper deals with the policies put in place by the Israeli government and 
the State of Palestine and how they might affect Palestinian entrepreneurs, predator firms, and 
the general economic environment of Palestine. Information on relevant policy changes, 
adoptions, implementations, etc. will be taken from government publications and 
announcements, from press sources, from the analyses of different think-tanks, and from other 
academic sources. The specific origination of each policy analysis, press report, etc. will be 
detailed where applicable. Although the primary purpose of this information will be to further 
develop the statistical worth of the foregoing segment of this paper, it will also be used as a 
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source to critique current policies of the Israeli government and Palestine in order to highlight 
areas where improvements can be made. The particular improvements that I will target in this 
paper are limited to entrepreneurial development and corresponding conflict resolution. Critiques 
will be based off of similar assertions by scholars and policy experts who have researched 
similar aspects of the Israel-Palestine relationship. Their analyses and their relationship to my 
own will be further detailed in the relevant parts of the results section of this paper.   
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CHAPTER III  
RESULTS 
 
Through a comprehensive review of Israel and Palestine’s joint political history, beginning with 
the foundation of the Palestinian Authority and continuing to the present, I have created a series 
of timelines that portray both key political events as well as social, economic, and other forms of 
data concurrently on the same chart. The purpose of these charts is twofold. First, they will be 
used to graphically illustrate correlations between various political circumstances and changes in 
the economy and entrepreneurial environment of Palestine, which will then be described in 
further detail in the text. Second, they are intended to provide future researchers with easy access 
to visual portrayals of data and their relationship to political events in order to facilitate analysis 
of the causes and effects of such happenings. This latter purpose fills a gap in the existing 
literature which could be overcome by providing researchers with an easy means of visualizing 
the data at hand before beginning their studies. Please note, I have chosen to focus on diplomatic 
events, attacks, conflicts and elections because of their well-documented effects on the economy. 
Of course, there are many possible external factors that could cause changes in the Palestinian 
economic and entrepreneurial environment, as well as non-political domestic factors, but such an 
analysis is beyond the scope of this project. Finally, this paper uses many abbreviations in the 
data section, for which a list of equivalencies can be found in the appendix.  
 
First of all, I will present in Table 1 a list of all those political events which I perceived as being 
most critical to a proper interpretation of statistical events (Kaplan 2008).  
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Table 1. Political Timeline of Israel and Palestine  
Start Date End Date Event 
9/13/93   Signing of Oslo I 
7/5/94   Yasser Arafat 
10/26/94   Jordan and Israel sign Peace treaty 
9/28/95   Signing of Oslo II 
11/4/95   Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin 
11/22/95 6/18/96 Shimon Peres 
4/11/96 4/27/96 Operation Grapes of Wrath 
6/18/96 7/6/99 Binyamin Netanyahu 
10/23/98   Wye River Memorandum 
7/6/99 3/7/01 Ehud Barak 
7/25/00   2000 Camp David Summit 
9/28/00 2/8/05 Second Intifada 
3/7/01 4/14/06 Ariel Sharon 
9/11/01   September 11 Attacks 
3/19/03 9/6/03 Mahmoud Abbas PM 
7/16/03   Road Map for Peace 
10/7/03 3/29/06 Ahmed Qurei PM 
11/11/04   Death of Yasser Arafat 
8/15/05   Israeli Disengagement from Gaza  
1/25/06   Hamas Election Victory in Gaza 
3/29/06 6/2/14 Ismail Haniyeh PM 
4/14/06 3/31/09 Ehud Olmert 
7/12/06   2006 Lebanon War 
6/10/07 6/15/07 Battle of Gaza 
6/15/07 6/6/13 Salam Fayyad PM 
11/27/07   Annapolis Conference 
2/29/08 3/3/08 Operation Hot Winter 
11/23/08   Mahmoud Abbas 
12/27/08 1/18/09 Gaza War (Operation Cast Lead) 
3/31/09   Binyamin Netanyahu 
5/31/10   Gaza Flotilla Raid 
10/18/11   Gilad Shalit Prisoner Exchange 
10/31/11   Palestinian UNESCO Membership 
3/9/12 3/14/12 Operation Returning Echo 
11/14/12   Operation Pillar of Defense 
11/29/12   UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19 
1/3/13   Proclamation of State of Palestine 
6/6/13 6/23/13 Rami Hamdallah PM 
7/29/13 4/29/14 John Kerry Peace Talks 
6/2/14   Reappointment of Rami Hamdallah PM 
7/8/14 8/26/14 Operation Protective Edge 
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It should be noted that some of these dates have been simplified. For example, Ahmed Qurei’s 
seven day interruption as Prime Minister has been skipped. Additionally, the positions and dates 
of service of Ismail Haniyeh and Salam Fayyad are somewhat controversial, but have also been 
simplified for the sake of cleaner analysis. Critical events listed in Table 1 will be indicated on 
the following time-series data charts. First off is the data on ease of starting a business in 
Palestine, which is illustrated in Table 2 and Chart 1. This information comes from the World 
Bank’s publicly available database, the World DataBank, as part of the Doing Business project 
(Doing Business Project 2014a; Doing Business Project 2014b). 
 
 Table 2. Legal Ease of Doing 
Business 
DATE STRUP BIZSTRT 
2004 12 93 
2005 12 93 
2006 12 93 
2007 12 92 
2008 11 48 
2009 11 48 
2010 11 48 
2011 11 47 
2012 11 47 
2013 9 45 
2014 9 44 
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Figure 1. Legal Ease of Doing Business 
 
This data will be used as a backdrop to explain changes in polled data on Palestinian perceptions 
of government corruption as well as their views on entrepreneurship. Particular emphasis will be 
given to the large decrease in business regulations that began in 2008 to see whether this had any 
effect on those perceptions.  
 
The following data covers some social statistics including refugee numbers and school 
enrollment rates. School enrollment rates will be used to identify entrepreneurship preparedness 
and attitudes to the government. Refugee statistics will be used as a backdrop for the problems of 
business registration and securing financial capital, which has consistently been a problem in 
Palestine. Bank statistics would be useful to further explore this facet of the Palestinian 
economy, but few are forthcoming at this time. The refugee data was also taken from the World 
DataBank, which sourced it from UNESCO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), and the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), both of which contributed in part 
to the data collection (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and United Nations 
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Relief and Works Agency 2014). The statistics on school enrollment were also taken from the 
World DataBank, which were sourced from UNESCO (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2013).  
 
Table 3. Population Statistics 
DATE REFPOP SECSCH TERSCH 
1993 1084838     
1994 1142905     
1995 1200972     
1996 1249368   16.35% 
1997 1308438   18.96% 
1998 1348288   20.69% 
1999 1384655 74.81% 23.11% 
2000 1428891 76.85% 23.86% 
2001 1483394 78.06% 26.12% 
2002 1532589 80.94% 28.04% 
2003 1587920 83.74% 32.30% 
2004 1634952 87.16% 37.06% 
2005 1685851 87.72% 41.34% 
2006 1739266 88.13% 44.23% 
2007 1793901 87.36% 48.90% 
2008 1836123 86.70% 50.65% 
2009 1885188 85.07% 48.97% 
2010 2015855 82.99% 50.06% 
2011 1895043 80.81% 51.31% 
2012 1944544 80.66% 49.06% 
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Figure 2. Population Statistics 
 
The following data consists of several macroeconomic indicators that are critical to the 
understanding of Palestine’s general economic status, which has great bearing on the success of 
its entrepreneurs. Gross domestic product and gross domestic product per capita, along with their 
growth rates, will be used to dissect the influences on corruption perceptions and the 
entrepreneurial environment. Foreign direct investment and gross capital formation will be used 
to track the amount of money that is being spent on economic investment. These data should be 
particularly useful in linear regression analysis to draw conclusions about possible factors 
causing business to be succesful or not. Additionally, youth unemployment, a rampant problem 
particularly in the conflict zones of the Middle East, will be used to gauge variations in attitudes 
towards corruption and entrepreneurship. The data was taken primarily from the World 
Databank, but data on foreign direct investment was sourced from the International Monetary 
Fund (World Bank National Accounts Data 2015; International Monetary Fund 2014). Table 4 
shows the data, and Graphs 3 and 4 portray it visually.   
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Table 4. Macroeconomic Statistics 
DATE GDPPC 
GDPPC
% GDP 
GDP
% CAPFOR FDI 
YTH
UN 
1993             37.6% 
1994 
 
$1,201.14     $2,842,261,249    40.3%   34.5% 
1995 
 
$1,325.99  2.4%  $3,281,382,697  7.12% 38.1%  $122,600,000.00  24.0% 
1996 
 
$1,316.77  2.6%  $3,407,783,959  7.27% 36.5%  $177,200,000.00  34.7% 
1997 
 
$1,389.29  18.6%  $3,760,126,840  24.01% 35.0%  $163,000,000.00  29.7% 
1998 
 
$1,465.01  22.8%  $4,067,692,861  25.93% 34.5%  $218,153,104.71  21.1% 
1999 
 
$1,499.60  15.0%  $4,271,509,596  17.97% 42.9%  $188,631,781.97  17.4% 
2000 
 
$1,477.15  -12.2%  $4,316,456,403  -9.88% 31.5%  $62,005,481.83  20.8% 
2001 
 
$1,336.92  -8.8%  $4,007,793,546  -6.42% 29.6%  $19,176,400.67  34.6% 
2002 
 
$1,156.75  -4.0%  $3,557,451,047  -1.47% 26.2%  $9,440,000.00  41.7% 
2003 
 
$1,254.93  6.4%  $3,959,278,955  9.21% 28.8%  $17,972,000.00  41.1% 
2004 
 
$1,336.97  6.1%  $4,327,268,305  8.88% 26.6%  $48,900,000.00  39.8% 
2005 
 
$1,455.93  8.2%  $4,834,276,371  11.05% 25.7%  $36,242,000.00  38.7% 
2006 
 
$1,442.82  -7.0%  $4,914,728,157  -4.54% 23.5%  $18,587,960.00  35.7% 
2007 
 
$1,576.29  -4.3%  $5,508,346,521  -1.77% 21.9%  $19,596,000.00  35.2% 
2008 
 
$1,855.46  -11.2%  $6,673,500,000  -8.63% 20.6%  $51,508,000.00  40.2% 
2009 
 
$1,963.20  17.5%  $7,268,200,000  20.94% 20.7%  $300,468,000.00  38.1% 
2010 
 
$2,338.72  -0.6%  $8,913,100,000  2.34% 21.6%  $153,641,047.79  37.7% 
2011 
 
$2,664.95  4.7%  $10,465,400,000  7.89% 17.8%  $235,320,965.56  34.1% 
2012 
 
$2,782.91  10.9%  $11,262,141,134  14.30% 21.1%  $179,597,571.02  38.6% 
2013   -7.2%   -4.43%    $177,205,348.44  38.3% 
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Figure 3. Macroeconomic Statistics 
 
 
Figure 4. Individual Level Finances 
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Next, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, which are a project of the World Bank, will provide 
useful data to be used in linear regression analysis. One of the only studies of governance to have 
been applied consistently over a long period of time in Palestine, it will serve as a proxy for other 
hard-to-measure theoretical concepts, such as corruption and the presence of predator firms. The 
individual categories are rated on a scale from -2.5, the worst, to 2.5, the best. According to the 
authors, “the six aggregate indicators are based on 31 underlying data sources reporting the 
perceptions of governance of a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments 
worldwide” (Kaufmann, Kraay, et al. 2010). This data is summarized in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Worldwide Governance Indicators 
DATE VOXACC POLSTAT GOVEFF REGQUA RULAW CORCON 
1996 -1.10 -1.65 -1.20 -0.92 -0.11 -0.93 
1997             
1998 -1.11 -1.66 -1.19 -0.94 -0.09 -0.92 
1999             
2000 -1.15 -1.66 -1.26 -0.97 -0.12 -0.97 
2001             
2002 -1.15 -1.77 -1.07 -1.05 -0.38 -0.97 
2003 -1.23 -1.35 -1.30 -1.06 -0.13 -1.10 
2004 -0.82 -1.10 -0.82 -0.64 -0.27 -0.42 
2005 -0.85 -1.37 -1.09 -1.04 -0.36 -0.98 
2006 -0.54 -1.70 -1.11 -1.14 -0.50 -1.10 
2007 -0.76 -1.95 -1.22 -1.40 -0.77 -0.81 
2008 -0.78 -1.97 -1.32 -1.15 -0.81 -1.15 
2009 -0.93 -2.03 -0.71 -0.17 -0.35 -0.36 
2010 -0.76 -1.94 -0.42 0.29 -0.21 -0.34 
2011 -0.96 -1.93 -0.63 0.29 -0.44 -0.80 
2012 -0.88 -1.94 -0.75 0.11 -0.46 -0.78 
2013 -0.87 -1.90 -0.78 0.15 -0.44 -0.71 
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Next, almost 18 years of data from the Al-Quds Index of the Palestinian stock exchange will 
provide useful insight into the effects of political upheavals and conflict on the financial situation 
of Palestine’s few large firms (Palestine Exchange 2015). It should be noted that the Al-Quds 
Index contains very few companies, but around half of them are banks or investment firms, 
which allows for better insight into the decision-making of and trust in Palestine’s financial 
sector. This index includes over 3,000 data points, so it is not feasible to list it here in tabular 
format. Instead, it is portrayed in Graph 5, and can also be referenced on the Palestine Exchange 
website.   
 
 
Figure 5. Stock Market Index 
 
Additionally, data on comprehensive closure days has been included from the Israeli 
humanitarian organization, B’Tselem, which retrieved them from the Israeli Defense Force 
spokesperson’s office (B’Tselem 2014). According to B’Tselem, “during a comprehensive 
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work, trade, or medical treatment are invalid,” and “residents are also not allowed to travel 
between the West Bank and Gaza” (B’Tselem 2014). This data will be used to determine 
correlations between Israeli security policy and its effects on the Palestinian entrepreneurial 
environment. Unlike many policy endeavors, this particular one is more easily quantified, and 
thus more easily analyzed. It is shown in Table 6. Please note, however, that data from 2014 was 
current only until June. 
 
Table 6. Comprehensive Closure Days 
DATE DAYS (Number) 
2000 73 
2001 244 
2002 77 
2003 178 
2004 163 
2005 132 
2006 122 
2007 34 
2008 52 
2009 55 
2010 44 
2011 31 
2012 11 
2013 7 
2014 5 
 
 
Finally, indicators on Palestinian businesses and entrepreneurships were taken from the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, which is tasked with the quantification of economic and 
demographic indicators for the State of Palestine (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2014a, 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2014b). It should be noted that the PCBS does not make 
clear who the licensor of the building permits is. It is possible that the building licenses 
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referenced here are granted by both Palestinian authorities and the Israeli Defense Force 
(especially in Area C), but there is no clarification from the PCBS on this matter. Were the 
resources and data available to break down these numbers into categories representing Areas A, 
B, and C, which all have different government arrangements with varying degrees of Palestinian 
sovereignty, the results of statistical analysis would not only have been more accurate, but also 
better tailored to specific regions. Unfortunately, such an analysis is currently not possible given 
currently available data.   
 
Table 7. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
Year Expenditure on new 
construction and 
additions (1000s USD) 
Building Licenses Issued 
in Palestine 
Number of Enterprises 
Engaged in Palestine For 
Industrial Activities 
1997 699.8  14438 
1998 985.5  14471 
1999 1,000.00 9,918 14849 
2000 351.8 8,301 14509 
2001 251.8 5,133 14605 
2002 379.6 3,325 14179 
2003 408.9 5,235 13693 
2004 811.3 5,008 12690 
2005 755.6 7,108 12211 
2006 464.7 6,061 11351 
2007 489.9 4,488 14508 
2008 540.2 4,546 14539 
2009  5,383 15322 
2010 657.1 6,332 15617 
2011 889.8 7,708 17090 
2012 908.9 8,239 16263 
2013 913.1 9,138 16201 
 
 
All data listed above has been collected with the intent of using it to conduct statistical analyses 
of their relationships with one another. However, the results seem to show that the relationships 
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between many of these indicators are murky and unclear. Some tests have hinted at little to no 
statistically valid relationship with such seemingly powerful factors as comprehensive closure 
days. These results have shown that more analysis is needed in order to reach more concrete 
conclusions, and possibly the inclusion of a wider variety of data. However, a number of useful 
relationships were drawn, which are detailed further below.  
 
All relationships shown below were constructed using the ordinary least squares linear regression 
model with the Student’s t-test distribution,  
 
Equation 1. 𝑦 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! +⋯+ 𝛽! + 𝑢 
 
In no case were the results of these regression analysis constructed optimally, due largely to 
heteroscedastic datasets. Additionally, it is difficult, if not impossible, to rule out the effects of 
omitted variable bias on the results of the study. However, a good faith effort was always made 
to reduce as much as possible endogeneity of all variables regressed. The results are presented in 
table 7. Regressions listed with a single asterisk (*) are significant where α=.05. Regressions 
listed with two asterisks (**) are significant where α=.01.  
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Table 8. Linear Regression Analysis 
y β1 Observations Coefficient Standard 
Error 
p-level R2 
Number of 
enterprises 
engaged in 
Palestine for 
industrial 
activities * 
Closure Days 14 -13.895 5.257 0.021 0.368 
Expenditure 
on new 
constructions 
and 
additions** 
FDI (100,000s) 16 0.243 
 
0.045 
 
.0001 0.672 
 
Building 
licences 
issued in 
Palestine* 
FDI (100,000s) 15 1.059 
 
0.477 
 
0.045 
 
0.275 
 
Number of 
enterprises 
engaged in 
Palestine for 
industrial 
activities** 
FDI (100,000s) 17 1.019 
 
0.3 
 
0.004 
 
0.435 
 
FDI* GOVEFF 15 194,790,004.685 
 
77,755,058.348 
 
0.026 
 
0.326 
 
FDI* CORCON 15 187,124,028.546 
 
86,219,930.492 
 
0.049 
 
0.266 
 
FDI* Closure Days 14 -788,904.705 
 
317,978.565 
 
0.029 
 
0.339 
 
 
 
For the final regression, encompassing FDI and comprehensive closure days, it is important to 
note that the independent variable is being used as a proxy for general levels of instability and 
violence. Because there is no reliable and available data on actual violence itself, this variable 
should be interpreted with the knowledge that closure days are often instituted as a response to 
general levels of instability and violence. Therefore, it is not a good representation of the effects 
of Israeli policy per se, but it does contain useful information on levels of violence as a whole. 
On the other hand, comprehensive closure days has far less omitted variable bias when it is used 
as the independent variable for the number of enterprises engaged in Israel for industrial 
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activities. As detailed by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, “the Israeli closure policy has led 
to the … suspension or closure of many enterprises,” which provides a strong theoretical support 
for the accuracy of comprehensive closure days as an independent variable for this particular 
regression (International Development Research Centre 2010).   
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CHAPTER IV  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on the results gathered from both the analysis of Israeli and Palestinian policy and 
economics, as well as the statistical assessment of the various indicators for entrepreneurship, 
investment, and corruption, a series of policy recommendations will be laid out as a possible path 
to achieve the improved conflict resolution so necessary for Palestinian peace prospects. The 
recommendations will be separated by country, first Israel, then Palestine, and finally a joint 
section which discusses needed areas of cooperation for both parties. Some additional theoretical 
backing will be included where the results pointed in unanticipated directions.  
 
Israel 
Israel’s primary role in this recommendation is one of a facilitator. It is unreasonable, both in 
economic and political terms, to assign Israel the primary role in rebuilding the Palestinian 
economy. This burden would not be acceptable to the Israeli public, regardless of whatever 
decisions might be made domestically or internationally as to the originator, perpetuator, or 
prime contributor to conflict in the region. Furthermore, a common theme in the discussion of 
Palestine and Palestinians is the idea of humiliation. According to David Lacey, “humiliation 
denotes the emotion associated with being treated disrespectfully and undeservedly by others” 
and it “occurs when others treat a group as if they perceive their worth or status to be lower than 
the group perceives it to be” (Lacey 2011). Too much Israeli involvement in Palestinian 
economic reconstruction is likely to be perceived as a kind of colonialism, which has been 
considered as a form of humiliation throughout the world (Memmi 1965). It is therefore 
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important that the Palestinians are able to take personal ownership of their reconstruction, not 
because it is entirely their duty to do so, but because it is important to avoid the sense of 
humiliation which Lacey suggests contributes to the ongoing cycle of violence. With this in 
mind, Israel’s best strategy would be to provide and maintain an environment in which 
Palestinians are able to build a better economy.  
 
Avoid Comprehensive Closure Days and Movement Restrictions 
First and foremost amongst Israel’s policy recommendations is to ease movement restrictions on 
Palestinians, especially those working in businesses. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
reports that 90% of Palestinian exports go to Israel, and 70% of its imports come from Israel 
(International Development Research Centre 2010). Aside from the obvious costs associated 
with the inability on as many as two out of three days of the year (during the beginning of the Al-
Aqsa Intifada), to enter Israel for commercial purposes, it is also important to note the difficulty 
of conducting business within Palestine itself (see Table 6 for numbers). In the Gaza Strip, Israeli 
embargoes and blockades have restricted or eliminated the import of many construction materials 
and agricultural equipment, largely on the back of security concerns. In the West Bank, areas of 
Palestinian sovereignty are broken up into a patchwork of territories that are rarely 
interconnected, being separated by areas of complete Israeli military control. By the Oslo 
Accords, three sections denoting three types of sovereignty delineate the map of Palestine . Area 
A falls under more or less complete control of the State of Palestine. Area B operates in a kind of 
condominium arrangement with Israel, where Palestine controls certain types of law, but Israel 
maintains security. Finally, Area C is under total Israeli military control and is not subject to 
Palestinian governance. Generally, Palestinians are prevented from developing or building on 
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this land, even though Israelis have built many illegal settlements here. Figure 6 illustrates the 
situation.  
 
Besides comprehensive closure days, other Israeli policies have a deleterious effect on the ability 
of Palestinian entrepreneurships to thrive. Checkpoints and roadblocks increase transportation 
costs and time needed to accomplish business (International Chamber of Commerce – Palestine 
2013). Many areas where a market could otherwise be available for expansion are off-limits to 
Palestinians. Additionally, in Chapter III, we saw that for every comprehensive closure days, one 
can expect 14 Palestinian businesses engaged in industry to close their doors. Happily, the 
number of closure days has declined markedly over the years. However, checkpoints, security 
barriers and roadblocks are still a significant hurdle to overcome, and if Palestine is to have any 
chance at sustained economic growth, these too must be minimized.  
 
Do Not Annex Area C 
Outright annexation of Area C, which would be illegal under international law, has begun to be 
touted by some in Israel’s government. The Times of Israel reported on April 27, 2014, that 
Naftali Bennett, leader of the Bayit Yehudi party and coalition member of the current Israeli 
government, believes that Israel should annex Area C in response to Palestine’s reluctance to 
negotiate with Israel (Times of Israel Staff, AP et al. 2014). Although he admitted that this was 
not an official viewpoint of the party, he nevertheless suggested that many other ministers would 
agree at least in part with his plan.  
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Figure 6. Occupation Zones (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2011) 
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The Times of Israel reports that Naftali Bennett’s position in the new coalition government is 
uncertain (2015), so perhaps it is not immediately likely that Israel would opt for this radical 
move, however, it is imperative that such an annexation not be made. Annexation of Area C 
would result in the permanent fragmentation of Palestinian sovereignty, reducing it to an 
archipelago of semi-sovereign, disconnected units between which travel and commerce is 
hampered constantly by the need to cross national borders dozens of times. Under such an 
arrangement, a shipment from Tulkarm to Hebron, both officially part of the State of Palestine, 
could very feasibly involve crossing international borders nineteen times. No guarantee of 
freedom of movement by Israel could possibly reduce to nil the negative effects of such an 
annexation.  
 
Even excluding the absurd cost of transportation that result from this arrangement, annexation of 
Area C would permanently reduce Palestine’s ability to develop its resources and land 
effectively for maximum productivity. Area C contains much of Palestine’s fertile land and water 
resources, and represents one of the best possible area of expansion for larger industries that need 
space in which to operate (Royle n.d.). Based on the increased cost of doing business and the 
removal of valuable land for expansion, it does not seem possible that an independent Palestinian 
economy could ever arise in such circumstances.  
 
Restrict Settlements 
Further Israeli settlements, which the international community has consistently viewed as illegal 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention (Barak-Erez 2006), should at present be restricted, and in 
the long run should be eliminated. According to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the 
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West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995), the land on which Israeli settlements have been built is 
Palestinian territory, but the maintenance of these settlements by Israel has constructed a security 
situation which justifies Israeli measures to restrict movement and development in Area C. 
Furthermore, the settlements have served as a groundwork argument for those wishing to annex 
Area C, which, as mentioned early, would prove devastating to the Palestinian economy.  
 
These three suggestions form a small part of the many needed changes in both Israel and 
Palestine to form a foundation for peace and prosperity. Many more alterations of policy and 
approach could be recommended, but based on the data collected in this study and the 
intentionally limited scope of the paper, these policies would be the most effective in 
accomplishing the goals of conflict resolution and improved entrepreneurial potential.  
 
Palestine 
Whereas Israel’s ideal job would be to act as the facilitator for improvement in the Palestinian 
economy, Palestine itself must be the primary agent of change. Many areas of Palestinian 
governance and economic management are in need of urgent changes. Even if Israel were to 
immediately and unconditionally withdraw from all of the occupied territories, it seems unlikely 
that Palestine would be able to develop its economy without first tackling these critical issues.  
 
Reduce Corruption 
Palestine has, throughout its modern existence, struggled against rampant, endemic corruption 
(Chêne 2012, Ramahi 2013). This corruption takes place in all sectors of the economy and of 
governance. Ramahi details the extravagance of many high-ranking public officials who have 
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channeled foreign aid and investment money into personal bank accounts and projects. In one 
instance, he describes how Ahmed Qurei, a former Prime Minister and legislator, used public 
funds to sponsor the cement used by Israel to build the separation barrier around and within 
Palestine. He also discusses endemic corruption within the commercial sector, where 
businessmen are under increasing pressure from domestic and foreign businesses to “toe the 
line” of the established system in order to maintain their positions. Interestingly, Chêne reports 
that Palestinian businesses rarely seem to experience corruption first hand. Indeed, she mentions 
that only 13% believe that they will need to bribe public officials in the coming years to 
accomplish their work. Nevertheless, 66.5% of businesses believe that corruption poses a major 
constraint to doing business in Palestine. It is possible that this discrepancy is due to the different 
levels at which corruption in Palestine is occurring. On the one hand, there appears to be 
relatively little corruption at the lowest levels of citizen-government interaction, but there 
appears to be almost ludicrously high levels of corruption in the uppermost echelons of 
Palestinian government. It would seem then, that corruption in Palestine is in large part due to 
the failure of the governing classes to purge corruption from amongst their ranks. Elliott Abrams, 
a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, describes a 
culture of corruption surrounding the uppermost levels of leadership in Palestine (2012). These 
are often the central administrators who decide where government funds and international aid are 
allocated, and it should be very clear how simple it is for many of those funds to go missing. 
Ramahi reports that between 2008 and 2012, nearly 2 billion euros in aid were lost to corruption. 
Here, it is important to look back at the statistics on foreign direct investment and its correlation 
with economic activities. High levels of foreign direct investment were very strongly correlated 
with greater expenditures on new constructions and additions as well as the number of firms 
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engaged in industrial activities. Foreign direct investment was also strongly correlated with the 
number of building licenses issued in Palestine for the same time periods. Perhaps most 
importantly however, higher levels of foreign direct investment were also strongly correlated 
with improved corruption control, which suggests that Palestine has a strong role to play in this 
sector to improve its economy. These statistics show that foreign investment is a critical part of 
the Palestinian economy, especially at its current stage of development, and is a vital part of 
Palestine’s pathway to economic success. It is understandable then, that corruption, which wastes 
away much of this investment and aid money, is a critical target for public administration reform 
in Palestine.  
 
Reform Financial System 
One of the most important changes in the needed in Palestine comes from the financial sector. It 
is a commonly recognized fact that entrepreneurs need an initial investment to start their 
businesses. Sometimes, the money needed to start a business is much greater than whatever 
personal funds or loans from relatives can afford. In such situations, a bank loan is needed to 
fund new business activities. In a study conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina following its strife 
with Serbia, Demirgüc-Kunt, Klapper, and Panos found that although a prior bank relationship 
does not increase the rate at which individuals become entrepreneurs, it “significantly increases 
the chances of survival for new entrepreneurs,” suggesting that such a relationship is 
“instrumental in survival” (Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, and Panos 2011). Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Palestine share several similarities in terms of their economy. Both countries have been subjected 
to a large degree of civil strife, both countries’ industries are made up primarily of small to 
medium-sized enterprises, and both have large informal sectors.  
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Problematically, however, Palestinians do not currently find themselves in a situation where 
access to finance is easily available. Many banks are reluctant to invest in industries which they 
see as being vulnerable to political instability and violence. The regression analysis in Table 8 
certainly bear out such concerns. Additionally, many Palestinian banks are hesitant to provide 
loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which they see as being far riskier than 
loans to individuals (Royle n.d.). According to the World Bank, only 9% of firms subsidize their 
operating expenses with credit, which is extremely low by international standards (Finance and 
Private Sector Group 2008). The same study indicated that one of the primary causes for the low 
level of engagement from SMEs with financial institutions stems from their insistence on almost 
exclusively using collateral as a guarantee for loans rather than a mix of collateral and income 
analysis.  
 
Furthermore, Palestine suffers from a unique refugee problem. As of 2012, its population stood 
at nearly 2,000,000, almost half the country’s population. These individuals, who generally live 
in refugee camps sponsored, owned, and supported by other organizations, primarily the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), exist in a state of limbo. While many have lived 
in these camps for their entire lives, and some even are third-generation refugees, their temporary 
status is maintained because it is often used as a bargaining chip with Israel over the “right to 
return” to areas occupied by Israel as long ago as the 1948 war (Al Husseini and Bocco 2009). 
However, as noted in the previous paragraph, banks tend to lend money only to those who can 
offer some form of collateral in return. Refugees, which make up such a large percentage of 
Palestine’s population, are scarcely able to meet such requirements given their living conditions. 
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Until a permanent settlement is reached in Palestine regarding the right to return, refugees find 
themselves in an awkward situation if they wish to be successful in their business activities 
because they are denied easy access to capital.  
 
With these considerations in mind, it is therefore important that Palestine institute needed 
financial sector reforms targeting the risk calculations of its banks. In order to allow for 
entrepreneurs to develop the working relationship with a bank that appears to be so important to 
firm survival, Palestine must incentivize its banks to offer loans to SMEs by reducing the 
requirement to offer collateral in exchange for credit. Additionally, special considerations should 
be made for those with refugee status wishing to start or continue in their businesses, perhaps 
through micro-credit programs that could meet their needs more effectively.  
 
Finally, it is critical that Palestine work to achieve a higher degree of political stability in its 
borders. Not only foreign investors but domestic banks too are spooked by political upheavals 
and violence, which severely affects their willingness to offer loans and investments to local 
businesses. This is, of course, a difficult goal to achieve, in large part because it is, in a sense, the 
end goal of these reforms itself. However, long-term stability is very different than short-term 
stability, and in this context, even short-term stability could offer substantial improvements to 
the ability of entrepreneurs to access financial capital to expand or found their businesses.  
 
Palestine and Israel 
Lastly, it is important to note a critical area in which Palestine and Israel would benefit most 
from cooperation with each other. Because cooperation between the two countries is often 
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fraught with strong political tensions on either side, it is important that this cooperation be as far 
removed from the political sphere as possible in order for its continuance to be assured. In 
Chapter I, the pioneering research on conflict resolution in Rwanda was discussed along with the 
research of Friedman and Desivilya into the potential for improved ties between Jews and 
Palestinians through social entrepreneurship. These studies indicate that increasing the amount 
and quality of interactions between Israelis and Palestinians could offer substantial 
improvements to both sides in terms of their views on each other and on conflict resolution 
generally. Critically, entrepreneurship in Palestine offers a unique opportunity to incorporate this 
strategy for conflict resolution into general economic improvement in Palestine. The Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor found in its survey of Palestinians that very few early-stage 
entrepreneurs made use of professional experts, lawyers, accountants, public business advisory 
services, or business development services as a source of advice or mentorship (International 
Development Research Centre 2010). Meanwhile, just across the border is a relatively 
prosperous country with an admired entrepreneurial culture. This concurrent presence of need 
and availability of supply offers a unique chance to integrate the contact theory seen in Rwanda 
into Palestine and Israel.  
 
This recommendation consists of a joint endeavor of Israel and Palestine for the latter to organize 
and enable local entrepreneurs to engage with and learn from the expertise of the former’s 
entrepreneurs. It would form a sort of knowledge exchange program, where Israelis 
communicate their professional knowledge and experience with entrepreneurship with 
Palestinians eager to improve their own businesses. Additionally, Israelis would be offered the 
chance to invest in an umbrella fund for all the Palestinian entrepreneurships represented in this 
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group. Monies would be disbursed by the Palestinian agency responsible for the program, but it 
would be overseen as well by the investors themselves. The disbursal by the Palestinian agency 
is important because it allows for a cleaner, less complicated international investment process 
and because it provides a degree of separation between Palestinian entrepreneurs and their Israeli 
sponsors, which to some in Palestine might be considered to be a kind of collaboration with the 
“enemy.” 
 
Although the chances for traditional manufacturing and service industries to benefit from this 
program is great, it is perhaps the tech industry that stands to gain the most. Palestinians are, 
according to the World Bank, amongst the best educated in the Middle East (World Bank 
National Accounts Data 2015). As early as 1999, Niron Hashai suggested that this educated 
workforce could be tapped by Israeli firms looking to outsource certain processes abroad (1999). 
He too pointed out the potential for spillover of Israeli knowledge into the Palestinian workforce, 
which could immensely benefit its international competiveness. Examples of cooperation 
continue to the present day, with Forbes magazine releasing a feature-length story about such 
cooperation as recently as 2013 (Behar 2013). Furthermore, there are already several 
organizations that are aiming to accomplish similar goals.  
 
For example, Wamda is an organization that is seeking to spread and develop entrepreneurial 
know-how to businessmen and women across MENA (About Wamda). The Palestinian 
Internship Program, which is primarily backed by USAID, provides Palestinians with the 
opportunity to work in 10-week long internships with Israeli tech firms (Palestinian Internship 
Program). Cooperation with such organizations or new programs based off of their structures 
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could provide fertile grounds to accomplish the goal of positively integrating Palestinians and 
Israelis in a working environment that could lead to greater respect and lessened hostility.  
 
There are a great many more needed changes within Israel and Palestine if lasting peace is to be 
achieved. However, the point of this paper was not to solve what has for so long been an 
intractable issue, but rather to propose possible policies that could point both parties in the right 
direction. Entrepreneurship has been shown both to be a vital factor to a country’s economic 
growth and future, and it has also been deemed a useful and promising vehicle for methods 
designed to improve conflict resolution between hostile parties. Although in the end it is the 
unique prerogative of Israel and Palestine to decide their national priorities, it would seem as 
though increased attention given to the field of entrepreneurship and its potential conflict 
diminishing aspects could offer new paths to promote peace in the region.  
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APPENDIX 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
STRUP Start-up procedures to register a business (number) 
TAXOFF Number of visits or required meetings with tax officials 
BIZSTRT Time required to start a business (days) 
INFPAY Informal payments to public officials (% of firms) 
VOXACC Voice and Accountability 
POLSTAT Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
GOVEFF Government Effectiveness 
REGQUA Regulatory Quality 
RULAW Rule of Law 
CORCON Control of Corruption 
REFPOP Refugee population by country or territory of asylum 
SECSCH School enrollment, secondary (% net) 
TERSCH School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 
GDPPC GDP per capita (current US$) 
GDP GDP (current US$) 
CAPFOR Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) 
YTHUN Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) 
GDPPC% GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
GDP% GDP growth (annual %) 
 
